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The Effect of Crises on Fiscal and Political Recentralization:  
Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries* 





Economic stability plays a key role in any fiscal and political decentralization process. In the 
face of financial and economic shocks, when revenues and expenditures are reduced, countries 
may decide to gather resources at the central level—creating a recentralization scenario—or 
may take away devolved powers and centralize political institutions. Using data for 75 
countries, we examine the effects of economic crisis on fiscal and political decentralization. 
We find that several types of crises lead to fiscal recentralization; only in the case of domestic 
borrowing crises is the effect further revenue decentralization, probably reflecting the central 
government’s willingness to empower subnational governments to avoid similar crises in the 
future. In addition, we explore the effects of economic crisis on political decentralization and 
find that they are concordant to the fiscal decentralization effects, suggesting an alignment of 
effects along political and fiscal dimensions of subnational autonomy. We also examine 
whether economic crises trigger more permanent, rather than just transitory, changes in the 
level of decentralization. We generally find more long-lasting effects in the case of fiscal 
decentralization measured from the expenditure side. This pattern is very apparent in the cases 
of inflation and banking crises and less clear but still present in the cases of currency and 
external debt crisis. The main results are robust to different specifications, estimation methods, 
and measurements of decentralization. 
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Over the past several decades, decentralization has been a trend that has taken over the 
world, with several distinct features across countries. There is no conclusive evidence regarding 
the causes or extent of decentralization. Some authors relate a high degree of decentralization to a 
higher income or urbanization (Letelier, 2005; Panizza, 1999), to other economic variables such 
as trade openness and income inequality, or to other fundamental country traits such as population 
and area size, ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity, or geographic fragmentation (Kee, 1977; 
Pommerehne, 1977). Some decentralization processes occur after political crises while others 
come from external forces and donor programs (Glimeus & Bustad, 2011) or even because of 
improvements in the accountability and transparency of local governments (Bos, 2012).  
Whatever its causes, decentralization has been found to offer a number of benefits. Through 
decentralization, policymakers have realized efficiency gains, reduced in operational costs, and 
improved public sector performance in service delivery because of higher responsiveness and 
accountability of subnational officials. Decentralization has enhanced democracy and likely 
decreased the risk of secession (keeping unity within a country); even in times of crisis, these 
dynamics may be expected to translate into policymakers being able to find better-adapted and 
possibly more cost-effective solutions (de Mello, Jr., 2000; Martínez-Vázquez, Lago-Peñas, & 
Sacchi, 2017). 
Despite those virtues and advantages, decentralization also presents some potential 
weaknesses or disadvantages. Perhaps the most entrenched one is that decentralization may 
weaken the ability of central governments to implement macro stabilization fiscal policies. 
Economic stabilization policies, which are needed in situations of high levels of inflation, high 
volatility of gross domestic product as a consequence of exogenous shocks, and unmanageable 





governments. Furthermore, fiscal stabilization policies typically need to coordinate with other 
macroeconomic policies such as monetary policies and exchange rates, functions that are also 
assigned at the central government (Ter-Minassian, 2009). In addition, some authors argue that 
under certain conditions (e.g., weak central bureaucracies or deep cultural divisions), 
decentralization could hamper efforts at macroeconomic stabilization and other economic reforms 
and potentially facilitate national fragmentation (Treisman, 1999).  
Whether fiscal decentralization is actually harmful to the attainment of macroeconomic 
stability is still very open to debate. Most recent studies seem to indicate that they key lies in the 
design of the fiscal decentralization system (Baskaran, 2010; Lago-Peñas, Martinez-Vazquez, & 
Sacchi, 2020; Neyapti, 2013). Regardless of what the actual impact of fiscal decentralization is on 
the ability of central governments to conduct macro stabilization policies, the important related 
question remains of whether, in practice, decentralized countries in times of fiscal crisis do actually 
take measures to recentralize the country fiscally and politically, reducing the effective level of 
decentralization. Could the impact of the 2008 Great Recession or the COVID-19 Pandemic of 
2020 be the catalyst of a changing trend toward centralization? While there have been past studies 
on fiscal decentralization trends (e.g., Bartolini, Sacchi, Salotti, & Santolini, 2018), little work has 
been done on the relationships between fiscal and political decentralization and economic crisis, 
especially at the international level. There is little evidence on the durability or permanence of 
crisis-induced changes in decentralization; this study fills that vacuum in the literature. 
We use data for 75 countries to explore the effects of diverse types of economic crisis on 
fiscal and political decentralization. We find that several types of crisis do lead to fiscal 
recentralization, while domestic borrowing crises are associated with further revenue 





decentralization, suggesting there is a correspondence between those two dimensions of 
subnational autonomy. In the paper, we also explore how durable or permanent those crisis-induced 
institutional changes are. We find a prevalence of permanent shocks (i.e., no reversion from 
recentralization) in the case of fiscal decentralization measured from the expenditure side. This 
pattern is apparent in the case of the inflation and banking crises and less robust but still present 
when we consider currency and external debt crises.  
The balance of the paper is organized as follows: in section two, we review the previous 
literature regarding decentralization and economic crisis; section three describes the data and 
lays out our estimation methodology; the empirical results are discussed in section four; section 
five discusses permanent versus transitory shocks; section six covers robustness checks; and the 
final section concludes with an overview of the findings and potential future directions of the 
research. 
2. Where Do We Stand? A Brief Review of the Literature 
Loosely speaking, “decentralization” refers to the devolution of power from the central 
governments to lower levels of government. It often involves a fiscal dimension in which the 
central government hands down expenditure responsibilities and tax and other revenue resources 
to subnational levels. Fiscal decentralization on the expenditures side sees more functional 
responsibilities and expenditures realized by subnational governments and on the revenue side 
includes more taxes assigned and collected at subnational levels as well as transfers received by 
the subnational governments. From a political dimension, decentralization can also involve a 
devolution or reallocation of power from the central to the local or regional governments, aiming 
to give citizens or their elected representatives more power in public decision-making. The two 
aspects, fiscal and political, often move together but need not always do so. We have seen that 





level to size of geography. However, much less is known about why countries may switch gears 
and recentralize. As Friedrich (1968) has noted, fiscally decentralized systems are dynamic in 
nature, always changing and evolving in response to political and economic forces—including 
economic crises. Generally speaking, countries that decentralize do not always remain 
decentralized; for example, Bos (2012) describes the significant ups and downs of the Netherlands 
as a decentralized country over the centuries. What may be the causes behind recentralization? 
One simple possibility is the reversal in trends of some of the very variables that have been found 
to be significant determinants of decentralization1. However, the very nature of most, if not all, of 
those variables makes each an unlikely source of recentralization. Alternatively, there are select 
cases in which substantial recentralization may be due to correcting some perceived major flaws 
in design. This was the case in China in 1994, where considerable centralization of revenue sources 
took place when the central government perceived that the provinces were not fairly collecting and 
sharing revenues upwards with the central government (Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez, 2006). Another 
noted example, which did not correct but actually caused a large increase in vertical fiscal 
imbalances, is the 1978 “Pacto Fiscal” in Mexico, where state governments agreed to cede most 
of their tax autonomous sources to the federal government in exchange for transfers and revenue 
sharing (Cabrera-Castellanos & Lozano-Cortes, 2008)  
Another potential source of recentralization pressures are exogenous shocks to the system 
of intergovernmental relations. This dynamic sometimes appears in the case of new discovery of 
oil resources in a country. Using a dataset of 77 countries over the period 1970–2012, 
Bhattacharyya et al. (2017) find that oil resource discovery (and not minerals) is a main driver of 
 
1 Some of the variables found to increase decentralization are population size, ethnic heterogeneity, income 





recentralization, but that this effect is moderated by democratization.  
Finally, Bos (2012) identifies, in the case of the Netherlands, the “deterioration of 
economic and political circumstances” as a main cause for recentralization, which we may simply 
term “crises.” In this paper, we focus on the potential role of much more general (across multiple 
countries) external shock: global economic and financial crises. As Bordo and James (2011) note, 
institutional developments in fiscal federalism are most often driven by exceptional events and 
deep crises such as the Great Depression of the 1930s, which led significant fiscal centralization 
processes in five federal countries they studied (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Germany, and the 
United States).  
While the existing literature does not have a lot to say about the effects of crises on fiscal 
and political decentralization, we can still identify some previous studies exploring several 
channels through which economic crisis can affect decentralization levels (Fedelino, 2008; 
Martinez-Vazquez & Smoke, 2011).  First, there are the direct effects of crises, such as decline of 
tax bases (e.g., falls in asset prices and economic activity), decline in tax compliance, upward 
pressure on cyclically sensitive expenditure programs, and also some more specialized 
consequences, such as pressure to bailout enterprises and banks, increases in interest payments, 
loss of market access, and so on.. How these direct effects of crises affect measured fiscal 
decentralization levels will depend on the overall composition effects; while tax bases will 
decrease for both the central and subnational governments and cyclically sensitive expenditure 
programs will likewise increase for both, the changes in revenue and expenditure decentralization 
measures will be affected by the relative size of the changes at the subnational and central levels. 
However, it is central government discretionary fiscal policy measures, which may be 





governments and the overall level of decentralization. After all, fiscal decentralization is often 
perceived, especially in ministries of finance, as a potential impediment for conducting macro 
stabilization policies (de Mello, 2000; Lago-Peñas et al., 2020). The indirect effects of a crisis will 
include losses of shared revenues and equalization funds resulting from automatic stabilizers and 
formula-driven determination of the pool of funds to be allocated, from discretionary tax cuts and 
the centralization of some tax sources, and/or from the weakened tax enforcement at the central 
government level. Conditional transfers from the central government may also decrease as part of 
discretionary actions by the central authorities or simply as another automatic response to funding 
mechanisms and revenue sharing rules that are based on current central revenue collections. Given 
the significant vertical fiscal imbalances (or, equivalently, the transfer dependence) that most 
decentralized systems exhibit, these measures are likely to have an important impact on the 
centralization of public expenditures. Recentralizing measures will vary depending on the history 
and relative successes and failures of the fiscal decentralization system in each country, but crises 
may offer the opportunity to redress some perceived design issues. The final outcome is likely to 
vary depending on the severity of the downturn in different regions, the structure of subnational 
debt, the structure of own and shared revenues of subnational governments, the extent of 
subnational responsibility for more cyclically-sensitive expenditures, and the nature and extent of 
central government support (Ter-Minassian, 2009). National governments may also hand the 
burden of fiscal adjustment down to subnational levels in times of fiscal stress (Ahrend et al., 
2014). Political destabilization from increased autonomy of regions within the country may be 
perceived as another potential downside of decentralization from a political perspective (Glimeus 






3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
In this section of the paper, we empirically revisit the explanatory power of economic crises 
and select other factors on recentralization processes in both fiscal and political dimensions and 
how durable or permanent those changes are. The sources of data for our analysis are the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), government finance statistics (GFS) (which was used to create 
the fiscal decentralization measures), the Reinhart-Rogoff economic crisis data, the polity IV 
index, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project data, and the World Development Indicators 
(which provides us with information such as child mortality and world population). 
As discussed by Panizza (1999) and Oates (1972), among many others, the main problem 
when empirically examining decentralization is finding a method to quantify the activity of local 
governments that results from autonomous expenditure decision-making and own-tax revenue 
raising. In practice, the data available do not allow us to measure true levels of autonomy, 
especially at a cross-country level. Instead, in the estimations we use the standard measures of 
fiscal decentralization (following Pryor (1968), Oates (1972), Panizza (1999), and Martinez-
Vazquez and Timofeev (2009) among many others). We define decentralization ratios as the 
percentage of revenues and expenditures of the subnational governments to the total revenues and 
expenditures of the public sector from 1960 to 2007.  
In addition to the main measures described above, we incorporate other determinants of 
fiscal decentralization that have consistently been found to play a significant role in the previous 
literature. Several studies have examined the main determinants of fiscal decentralization using a 
fairly consistent set of variables. One of the most-used variables is a proxy for development. 
Decentralization may itself be “a superior good, the demand for which is likely to grow with per 





may have more time and greater motivation to participate in making local political decisions. They 
may also become more skilled at organizing to pressure the central government to devolve 
authority and fiscal resources. Increases in development may also induce a shift in tastes towards 
public goods and services that are most efficiently provided locally. Bahl and Nath (1986), Letellier 
(2005), Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2009), and Desai et al. (2005) find a positive relationship 
between economic development and fiscal decentralization. However, this result is not conclusive: 
Oates (1972) finds a negative relation of economic development and fiscal decentralization and 
Panizza (1999) finds that the effect differs when outliers are excluded from the analysis. This 
complexity calls for the inclusion of one or more proxies for economic development in our 
analysis; therefore, we include GDP per capita and infant mortality in the controls.  
As Alesina and Spalaore (1997), along with Triesman (2006), argue, institutional variables 
play a key role in the design of the state. In this line of reasoning, another set of empirical studies 
of the determinants of decentralization also include the extent of democracy as a control variable 
but results tend to be ambiguous. Some have suggested there is a natural affinity between political 
rights and decentralization; political participation at the local level might educate citizens in 
democratic practices and would push for higher levels of political rights. At the same time, strong 
local governments might serve as a check on abusive central authorities and would push for better 
social controls. In this sense, less corrupt countries would push for stronger local governments, 
implying higher levels of fiscal decentralization. Indeed, across Eastern Europe, the collapse of 
regimes in which power was centralized in the communist party prompted strong demand for 
autonomous local self-government (World Bank, 2001). Accordingly, we include controls such as 
a measure of political rights and a corruption index in the analysis to control for institutional 





Panizza (1999), Letellier (2005), and Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2009) argue that 
ethnic fractionalization captures changes in the preferences of individuals; therefore, this argument 
is an economic efficiency one, since tastes for public goods and services are likely to vary across 
ethnic groups. Triesman (2006) sets an additional argument towards the inclusion of ethnic 
variables based on practical politics. He argues that where ethnic divisions are politicized (and 
ethnic groups are territorially compact), decentralizing authority over such contentious policy 
issues as education and culture may help to restrain communal violence or even prevent civil war. 
To be credible, policy decentralization must have some fiscal component. Thus, to preserve 
stability, central elites in more ethnically divided societies may choose a higher level of fiscal 
decentralization. Of course, they also may not. Central leaders may care more about other goals—
retaining fiscal resources at the center, for instance—than about avoiding communal violence. 
Moreover, even if they do decentralize, this may fail to prevent ethnic violence or to preempt 
demands for secession.  
Regarding the crisis variables employed in the paper, we rely on the Reinhart-Rogoff 
(2010) dataset. The authors built an annual crisis dataset spanning 1800 to 2010 with information 
on a variety of economic crises such as banking, currency, domestic and external default or 
restructuring, and inflation for 70 countries. In order to match this data to the decentralization 
dataset (GFS), we use the crisis dataset from the year 1970 to 2010.  
The corruption variable is a composite index of the perceived level of corruption. This 
indicator is constructed as a Bayesian index that relies on data from well-known sources, such as 
the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International) and the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (World Bank). The construction of the index and its main characteristics are described 





comes from Ilzetzki et al. (2017) while the short-term liabilities proportion is derived using 
information from the IMF. 
3.2 Summary Statistics 
 
Typically, we observe a high correlation between economic development and fiscal 
decentralization: on average, more developed nations present higher levels of fiscal 
decentralization and have also been exposed to a higher number of crisis episodes (see Table 1).  
Table 1: Decentralization Levels, 1970-2016 
Income Level 
Average percentage of total 
expenditures for 
subnational governments 
Average percentage of 




Lower 14.53 12.54 148 
Lower-Middle 20.39 13.96 448 
Upper-Middle 20.13 12.15 363 
High-Income, non-OECD 12.81 11.07 -(**) 
High-Income, OECD 33.38 20.90 581 
Source: Own elaboration, from IMF Fiscal Decentralization Dataset, OECD World Observatory 
on Subnational Spending and Finance (expenditures and revenues), and Harvard’s Behavioral 
Finance and Financial Stability. (**): It is not that there were no crises in high-income non-
OECD countries. We are simply missing information about crisis episodes in these countries: 
Cyprus, Israel, Malta, Slovenia, and UAE. 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of all the variables for the estimation of our models. 
Because the data comes from different non-uniform sources, there is some variability in the years 
available for some variables depending on the country. For OECD countries, older information 
regarding the degree of decentralization is available, while for emergent and developing countries, 
this availability is more limited. In this sense, given the information available, the time span of the 







Table 2: Summary Statistics 
  Average SD Min Max 
Local revenues 16.62 13.42 0.04 89.22 
Local expenditures 25.50 16.20 0.18 81.36 
Currency crisis 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Inflation crisis 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Stock market crisis 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Banking crisis 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Domestic debt crisis 0.02 0.15 0 1 
External debt crisis 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Crisis episodes 0.77 0.99 0 6 
Any crisis dummy 0.35 0.48 0 1 
GDPpc (log) 9.30 1.06 6.58 12.41 
Population MM (log) 2.40 1.66 -1.59 7.20 
Polity IV Index 4.68 6.95 -10 10 
Mortality(log) 2.84 0.99 0.64 5.33 
Primary enrollment rate 101.71 11.80 17.31 165.65 
Source: Own elaboration 
In Table 2, we can see that decentralization from the expenditures side is slightly higher 
than from the revenue side. However, as we have panel data, the summary statistics conceal 
potentially higher variability in the data. Concerning the information related to the different types 
of crises, the information in Table 1 shows that the stock market crisis is the most prevailing among 
them, followed closely by inflation and banking crisis. On average, 71% of the countries have 
suffered at least one crisis during the period covered by the sample (1970 – 2010), which may 
seem a high percentage but is in line with the figures declared in Reinhart (2010). We further 




















































Figure 3. Accumulated Crisis Episodes 
 
3.3 Methodology 
In order to identify the relationship between crisis and fiscal/political decentralization, we 
aim to estimate the following equation: 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓/𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 ⋅ 𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷 ⋅ 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
where "fiscal decentralization" is measured by the proportion of expenditures or revenues 
transferred/earned by local governments to the total government expenditures and revenues, 
respectively; “political decentralization” is measured using the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) 
dataset (Coppedge, 2020). Specifically, we used the following variables as potential proxies to 
political decentralization:  
• Regional government index: “Are there elected regional governments, and — if so — to 
what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional 
level?”  
• Local government index: “Are there elected local governments, and — if so — to what 






“Crisis” is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a specific type of crisis (inflation, exchange 
rate, sovereign debt, domestic debt, stock exchange, or banking) has been observed in the country 
i and year t.  
In order to get a sense of the direction of the main variables (i.e., fiscal/political 
decentralization and crisis), we first rely on calculating simple correlations (without covariates). 
While regressions without controls do not give a good or complete picture of the true link between 
two variables, we first looked at these relationships in order to explore the data and get a sense of 
the magnitude and direction of the potential effect of crisis on decentralization. For all of our 
comparisons, both fiscal decentralization in expenditures and fiscal decentralization in revenues 
are analyzed. This comparison gives a general idea of what to expect when controls are added and 
show how the results can vary dependent on the type of crisis. We then run the regressions with 
controls, which were chosen based on what we thought could affect a government's decision to 
decentralize in addition to typical controls such as GDP and population. 
Furthermore, to the estimation of equation (1) using panel data fixed-effects model 
(assuming both country and year- fixed effects-FE), we explore the use of instrumental variables 
(specifically, a 2SLS strategy), in order to overcome the potential bias remainder of the F.E. model. 
In specific, we estimate the following equations: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝜷𝜷𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊 + 𝑢𝑢_𝑓𝑓          (2) 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝜹𝜹𝒀𝒀𝒊𝒊 + 𝛾𝛾𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈_𝑓𝑓          (3) 










Figure 4: Correlations Between Type of Crisis and Fiscal/Political Decentralization 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration.                                                              *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
 
As Figure 4 shows, external debt and inflation crises episodes are those that show the 
strongest correlation with the level of decentralization. As one would expect, the sign of this 
correlation is negative, which means that the occurrence of these types of crisis triggers a 























































Currency crises are also associated with a decreasing level of decentralization. Additionally, 
statistically significant effects are observed when the number of crisis episodes and a crisis dummy 
(which takes the value of one if any type of crisis is observed and zero otherwise) are taken into 
account, with the expected effect on the level of decentralization (i.e., a negative effect). With 
respect to political decentralization, excepting stock market and banking crises, there seems to be 
a negative and statistically significant correlation between both proxies of political decentralization 
and the occurrence of an economic crisis. The strongest relationships are those regarding debt 
episodes (both domestic and external).  
As one of the archetypical categories of crisis, we expect to see an inflation crisis have a 
negative correlation with decentralization. Latin America has experienced around 282 inflation 
crises from 1950 to 2004. During times of high inflation, it is sensible that the central government 
will pull back funds from subnational governments. Central governments need to take quick action 
when an inflation crisis arises before hyperinflation or a currency crisis can occur. Inflation crises 
are combated by curbing spending and central banks must raise interest rates to garner investment 
and discourage debt. As the previous literature has emphasized, strong subnational governments 
pose a threat in unstable times, especially if they rely on transfers from the central government. 
The central government will not want to risk subnational deficits, thus another reason for the 
negative correlation. In addition to the inflation crisis, the external debt crisis and currency crisis 
show the strongest correlations when considering decentralization from either the revenues or 
expenditures side. 
It is interesting to note that the correlation of domestic debt and banking crisis with revenue 
and expenditure decentralization is positive, in contrast with other types of crises. In particular, 





often involve the subsequent rescue or bail out of those subnational governments by the central or 
federal authorities—as was the case in Argentina and Brazil over several of the last decades of the 
twentieth century. In these cases, the response of the central/federal authorities may be to 
accompany the measures of the bail out with empowering subnational government with additional 
revenue autonomy so to avoid similar situations of insolvency in the future. The importance of this 
observation is that not all crises may lead to recentralization. As is logical in the case of subnational 
debt crises, the result would seem to be greater decentralization on the revenue side. 
After exploring these correlations, we aim to exploit the panel structure of the dataset in 
order to account for unobserved effects by country and by year. This strategy gives us some 
advantages in the form of the inclusion of unobserved fixed effects that could be correlated with 
the error terms in the regressions. However, one fundamental assumption of this approach is that 
these fixed effects are constant in time, an assumption that is difficult to test. In order to overcome 
this strong assumption, we later use an IV methodology in order to get rid of the potential 
endogeneity between crisis and decentralization.  
4. Results 
As mentioned above, the results of pooled OLS estimation could be biased if we do not 
consider the panel data dimension of the model. In this sense, we estimate a panel data fixed-
effects model, in which the fixed effect corresponds to each country of our sample. Hence, it 
absorbs all the unobservable factors that are constant in time, but that vary country to country, and 
that could be correlated with our covariates. Table 3 shows the results of the F.E. model using the 
fiscal and political decentralization variables, and considering only country fixed effects, and both 






Table 3: Results from the F.E. Model 
  Expenditures Revenues Regional Govt Index Local Govt Index  
Currency crisis 
-0.0049 -0.0020 -0.0047 -0.0024 -0.0020 0.0049 0.0124 0.0215*  
(0.0060) (0.0074) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0217) (0.0197) (0.0117) (0.0126)  
Inflation crisis 
-0.0160 -0.0193 -0.0051 -0.0061 -0.0584 -0.0548 -0.0464* -0.0340  
(0.0108) (0.0147) (0.0155) (0.0157) (0.0504) (0.0515) (0.0263) (0.0335)  
Stock market crisis 
-0.0009 -0.0074 0.0026 0.0031 -0.0189 -0.0280 -0.0112 -0.0176  
(0.0052) (0.0077) (0.0046) (0.0059) (0.0158) (0.0197) (0.0100) (0.0135)  
Banking crisis 
-0.0146* -0.0126 -0.0021 -0.0007 -0.0027 0.0073 -0.0229 -0.0112  
(0.0074) (0.0078) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0262) (0.0248) (0.0136) (0.0145)  
Domestic debt crisis 
0.0017 0.0011 0.0487*** 0.0460*** -0.0232 -0.0064 -0.0128 0.0135  
(0.0194) (0.0191) (0.0132) (0.0151) (0.0486) (0.0487) (0.0422) (0.0427)  
External debt crisis 
-0.0290 -0.0115 0.0145 0.0221 -0.0298 -0.0117 -0.0227 -0.0050  
(0.0185) (0.0178) (0.0184) (0.0177) (0.0708) (0.0683) (0.0454) (0.0488)  
Crisis episodes 
-0.0071** -0.0069* -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0141 -0.0116 -0.0100 -0.0065  
(0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0156) (0.0167) (0.0080) (0.0100)  
Crisis dummy 
-0.0118** -0.0084 -0.0031 -0.0013 -0.0023 0.0089 -0.0054 0.0071  
(0.0054) (0.0060) (0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0227) (0.0215) (0.0119) (0.0139)  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year Fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes  
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
The F.E. model using the decentralization variable from the expenditure side implies a 
statistically significant relationship with the banking crisis dummy, with the number of crisis 
episodes, and with the crisis dummy (not considering year fixed effects). The sign of the 
relationship is as anticipated (negative) and implies a recentralization between 1 and 2 percentage 
points. The effect regarding the crisis episodes and the crisis dummy are weaker and imply 
marginal effects of less than one percentage point. Interestingly, the fixed-effects specification 
implies again a positive coefficient regarding the domestic debt crisis, as compared with the simple 
correlation (OLS). As we mentioned above, this could reflect the central government willingness 
to empower subnational governments, perhaps with increased revenue autonomy or other types of 
self-determination to avoid similar crisis in the future. 





could distinguish from the regressions. While all the results using the regional government index 
are statistically non-significant, the local government index regressions show diverging effects 
concerning only the currency and inflation crisis. 
4.1 IV Model 
 
The model showed so far neglects that the relationship between decentralization and crisis 
(whatever its nature) could be endogenous: while crisis affects decentralization, the contrary could 
also be possible. For example, decentralization reform would trigger an economic crisis because 
the central government in a decentralized country now receives less revenue. In addition, the 
reform itself could be costly, and, in a situation of financial fragility, it could cause fiscal 
difficulties or an inflationary spiral. In that sense, we take this potential endogeneity into account 
by estimating an IV model with our sample. We rely on two types of instruments: the exchange 
rate regime and the country's short-term liabilities share. The rationale is that a fixed exchange rate 
regime would make it difficult for a country to solve their balance-of-payments crisis via an 
exchange rate depreciation. On the other hand, a high share of short-term liabilities would imply 
that a country is more vulnerable to capital flights, which in turn might unchain a different type of 
crisis. 
Exchange rate regimes that are fixed or close to fixed have been considered as more prone 
to a crisis than their more flexible counterparts. For example, Bubula and Ötker (2003) consider 
them "… susceptible to speculative attacks and devaluations, and the intensity and scope of the 
crisis episodes have called into question the viability of these regimes in a world of highly 
integrated international capital markets." 
A seminal paper regarding exchange rate regimes and its relationship with crises also 





likelihood of a financial crisis (Calvo & Reinhart, 2002, p. 379). Maintaining a hard peg is 
considerably difficult, with a median duration of one year (Bubula & Ötker, 2003). Other authors 
consider that, in order to prevent currency crises, countries should apply either full floating or 
completely fixed exchange regimes (Edwards, Cavallo, Fraga, & Frenkel, 2003). There is evidence 
that pegged regimes could be more subject to speculative attacks, making them more prone to 
crises (Bubula & Ötker, 2003).  
Table 4 shows the results of the IV model using an instrument based on the exchange rate 
regime of the country. We create several dummy variables according to the exchange rate regime 
(making a total of five dummy variables to avoid the dummy variable trap). The results regarding 
the fiscal decentralization using this instrument are shown in Table 4. While the estimated 
coefficients have the expected negative sign, the F-statistic from the first stage is insufficient to 
satisfy the rule of thumb of F-stat>10. Indeed, only the coefficient corresponding to the inflation 
crisis is statistically significant and, at the same time, accompanied by a non-weak instrument from 
the first-stage results. The coefficients corresponding to the banking crisis and domestic debt crisis 
are significant, but the instrument associated with its estimation is weak. The magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients varies from 1 to 5 percentage points. Interestingly, the results from the fiscal 
decentralization specification (expenditures’ side) are quite similar to the results for our political 
decentralization proxies (regional government index), reinforcing the idea that economic crises 
could cause “recentralization” with respect to the political dimension of decentralization. This is 
especially true when the domestic debt crisis, banking crisis, number of crises episodes, and crisis 
dummy are considered as factors behind recentralization. On the other hand, a higher level of 
government (in this case the regional government, compared to the local government) seems to be 






Table 4: Results from the FE-IV Model, using Exchange Rate Regime Dummy Instrument 
Crisis Type Expenditures Revenues Regional Govt Index Local Govt Index 
IV F-stat IV F-stat IV F-stat IV F-stat 
Currency -0.0289** 15.6 0.0016 15.476 -0.0433 27.028 -0.0384 29.159 
Inflation -0.0412*** 28.691 -0.0027 26.332 -0.0615 56.689 -0.0318 69.923 
Stock -0.2105 0.681 -0.0582 0.764 0.1171 1.943 -0.2826** 1.946 
Banking -0.0759*** 4.412 -0.0043 4.075 -0.1458* 6.156 -0.0482 5.207 
Domestic debt -1.2993 0.606 -0.2068 0.525 0.2815 2.191 1.0439** 2.204 
External debt -0.2132*** 4.336 -0.036 5.308 -0.1708** 12.22 -0.0199 11.279 
Crisis episodes -0.0211*** 19.287 -0.0023 20.12 -0.0248* 43.352 -0.0119 42.1 
Crisis dummy -0.0746*** 17.307 -0.0111 17.25 -0.0780* 31.979 -0.0372 33.826 
Country F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
5. Permanent Versus Transitory Shocks: Reversion of Recentralization 
Our IV estimation results using an exchange rate regime dummy as an instrument showed 
that the effect of economic crises on fiscal decentralization resulted in reduced decentralization (at 
least from the expenditure side). However, a relevant question to ask in this context is how 
permanent these changes are. 
To further investigate whether the effect of economic crises in reducing decentralization is 
permanent or transitory, we make use of a Panel Vector Autoregression model (PVAR) to estimate 
the impulse-response functions of a shock from a determinate type of crisis and its effect on the 
reduction (or increase) in decentralization levels, and most importantly, whether this effect tends 
to be permanent or transitory. 
VAR models, well established in applied macroeconomics, have been increasingly used in 
applied research to capture the dynamic interdependencies present in the data; in particular, shock 
identification can transform these reduced-form models into structural ones, allowing impulse 
response analyses or policy counterfactuals, among others (Canova & Ciccarelli, 2013). 





fiscal decentralization indicator (both from the expenditure and revenue sides). The pattern that 
emerges is the prevalence of permanent shocks (i.e., no reversion from recentralization) in the case 
of fiscal decentralization measured from the expenditure side. This pattern is apparent in the case 
of the inflation and banking crises and less clear but still present when we consider the currency 
and external debt crisis. 
A potential explanation of these results would be that the expenditure recentralization is 
persistent due to the central government’s reluctance to decentralize spending powers to local 
governments after a crisis. In contrast, fiscal decentralization from the revenue side would be more 
“flexible” (in the sense of reversing the recentralization trend after some time) considering that 
local governments need to cover their needs even after a crisis, and therefore could envisage other 
venues to fundraising. The graphs in Figure 5 show the effects of “shock” in a determinate type of 
crisis on the level of decentralization over time.  
It is important to mention that, in line with our results from the OLS and fixed-effects 
models, the shock from domestic debt crisis seems to be to the reverse of the results with the other 
types of crisis (that is, implying a movement towards greater decentralization). As we mentioned 
above, this result may be explained by the central government’s objective of strengthening the 















Figure 5: Impulse-Response Functions According to Different Types of Crisis 
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6. Robustness Checks 
6.1 Exploring Heterogenous Effects by Income  
 Do the effects of crises differ by the level of country development? We split the sample 
between low, middle, and high-income countries according to the OECD classification in order to 
examine potential heterogeneous effects. In particular, it is possible that countries in one group 
that are more prone to decentralization reforms are also more vulnerable to a certain (or most) type 
of crises. Alternately, it may be the effects vary by how recent decentralization reforms are, as in 
the case of many developing countries vis-à-vis more established and flexible decentralized 
institutions in developed countries. The estimation results from applying this sample split are 
shown in Table 5. We can see that the results for middle- and high-income countries are stronger 
(in a statistical sense) than for low-income countries. These results may be related to the strength 
of the shocks or for institutional design reasons. In the case of the former, lower-income countries 
may be less vulnerable to some types of crises, such as capital market-type crises, because they 
are less intertwined with global capital markets. From an institutional perspective, more recent 
developments of decentralization may be more difficult to reverse or adjust. However, we can also 
see that middle-income countries are much more affected than high-income countries. This latter 



























exception of banking crises). 
Table 5: Heterogeneous Effects (Regarding Income Level) from the IV Model 
Crisis 
type 
Low Income Middle Income  High Income 
Exp. F-test Rev. F-test Exp. F-test Rev. F-test Exp. F-test Rev. F-test 
Currency 0.0122 19.804 0.0100 44.269 -0.0230 8.913 0.0054 10.561 -0.0786 1.932 -0.1231 1.516 
Inflation 0.0088 30.265 0.0092 54.098 -0.0829*** 13.352 -0.0034 17.149 0.2496 0.744 0.3192 0.849 
Stock 0.0005 3.224 0.0331 1.650 -0.2200 0.497 -0.0316 0.628 -0.0177 0.665 0.2163 0.802 
Domestic 
debt 0.0000 . 0.0000 . -1.4426 0.502 -0.3151 0.505 -6.2089 0.316 0.0000 . 
Foreign 
debt -0.0100 1.865 -0.0242 3.158 -0.2053*** 5.956 0.0069 7.603 -1.7019 1.603 -0.6153 0.952 
Banking -0.0144 4.338 0.0003 5.134 -0.1612*** 2.389 0.0024 2.544 -0.1880** 1.553 -0.2053** 2.181 
Crisis 
episodes 0.0029 11.071 0.0034 14.202 -0.0318*** 12.190 0.0004 16.095 -0.2749 0.456 -0.1882 0.620 
Crisis 
dummy 0.0292 4.092 0.0024 3.062 -0.0882*** 9.186 0.0045 11.671 -0.3981 0.545 -0.3616* 1.032 
6.2 A Different Measure of Decentralization Level 
As a last robustness check we use a different data set to measure decentralization. 
Specifically, we approximate the decentralization “level” of the countries in our sample with the 
Regional Authority Index (RAI) (Hooghe et al., 2016). The RAI measures the authority exercised 
by regional governments within countries. The latest release of the data expands geographical 
coverage to 96 countries (including China, India, Pakistan), extends the time period from 1950 
through 2018, and also covers metropolitan regions. The RAI includes five dimensions of self-
rule: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy, and representation; 
and also five dimensions of shared rule: law making, executive control, fiscal control, borrowing 
control, and constitutional reform. Results of the regressions using the RAI as a dependent 
variable (and still considering the exchange regime variable as the instrumental variable) are 







Table 6. Results from the RAI Variable to Measure Decentralization 
  Exchange Regime Instrument (Standard Error) F-stat 
Currency crisis -2.3702* 25.021 
  (1.2906)   
Inflation crisis -1.5651* 65.140 
  (0.8342)   
Stock market crisis 35.4637 0.137 
  (99.4221)   
Domestic debt crisis -3.6931 10.056 
  (2.2668)   
External debt crisis -16.3887 4.217 
  (12.2786)   
Banking crisis -2.0979* 45.720 
  (1.1785)   
Crisis episodes -0.5699** 65.382 
  (0.2885)   
Crisis dummy -2.3128* 21.774  
(1.2567)   
The results show at least weakly significant negative coefficients for the expected effects 
of recentralization in reaction to most types of economic crisis and the F-stats indicate a strong 
instrument. Thus, the effect of a currency crisis, an inflation crisis, a domestic debt crisis, a banking 
crisis, the number of crisis episodes, and our dummy indicate that the occurrence of a crisis 
generates recentralization even when the level of decentralization is measured from a broader 
perspective (the RAI variable). 
7. Conclusions  
Over the years, the literature on decentralization and fiscal federalism has paid a lot of 
attention to the determinants and impact of decentralization processes. However, even though it is 
often observed, the literature has paid much less attention to why countries that have decentralized 
reverse that process and proceed to recentralize along fiscal and political dimensions. In this paper, 
we examine the potential role of economic crises on recentralization processes.  
Our main finding is that economic stability indeed plays a key role in fiscal and political 
decentralization process. In the face of financial and economic shocks, when revenues are reduced 





fiscal resources at the central level, as well as take away previously devolved powers and centralize 
political institutions.  
Using data for 75 countries covering a period of four decades (1970 to 2010), we examine 
the effects of different types of economic crisis on fiscal and political decentralization. We find 
strong evidence that several types of economic crises lead to fiscal recentralization. However, in 
the case of domestic borrowing crises, the effect is further revenue decentralization, probably 
reflecting the central government’s willingness to further empower subnational governments with 
greater revenue autonomy to avoid a similar crisis in the future. In addition, we explore the effects 
of economic crisis on political decentralization and find that they are concordant to those for fiscal 
decentralization. This alignment of effects along political and fiscal dimensions of subnational 
autonomy underlines the system-wide structural nature of the recentralization response. It is also 
significant that the economic crises end up triggering more permanent, rather than just transitory, 
changes in the level of decentralization, at least from the perspective of fiscal decentralization 
measured from the expenditure side. This pattern is especially present in the cases of inflation and 
banking crises and less clear but still present in the cases of currency and external debt crisis. These 
main findings are robust to different specifications, estimation methods, and measurements of 
decentralization. 
With virtually the entire world having recently experienced an economic crisis associated 
with the COVID-19 pandemic and the hard policy coordination issues that have consequently 
appeared in many multi-level governance systems, it will be interesting to see in the coming years 
whether these types of crises also lead to recentralization processes along fiscal and political 
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